Seminar Invitation | Th. 18 October | Sebastian Gryglewicz | Erasmus University Rotterdam
|
ΠΑΝΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΙΟ ΠΕΙΡΑΙΩΣ |
|
UNIVERSITY OF PIRAEUS |
|
The Department of Banking and Financial Management announces the upcoming seminar with “Delegated Monitoring and Contracting” Seminar Organizers: Assist. Prof. Michail Anthropelos, Prof. George Skiadopoulos |
|
Abstract: We study a continuous-time agency model in which a principal invests in a firm run by a manager and monitored by an intermediary. Both the manager and the intermediary are subject to moral hazard. We analyze two different contracting settings that differ by the type of intermediation. In delegated monitoring, the principal can provide the optimal level of incentives to both the intermediary and the manager. In delegated contracting, the principal offers a contract only to the intermediary, who in turn designs a contract for the manager. Optimal incentives are qualitatively different across the two cases. Whereas a strong performance shifts incentives from the manager to the intermediary under delegated monitoring, it increases incentives for both agents under delegated contracting. Agency conflicts at the intermediary level lead to an overprovision of managerial incentives under delegated monitoring and an underprovision of managerial incentives under delegated contracting.
Sebastian Gryglewicz is Associate Professor of Finance at the Erasmus School of Economics at Erasmus University Rotterdam. He has a PhD in Economics from Tilburg University (2008). His research interests focus on corporate finance and in particular on investment and financing policies, effects of competition, financial distress, and agency conflicts. His work has been published in the Journal of Financial Economics, the Review of Financial Studies, and Games and Economic Behavior. More information can be found at his personal website at http://personal.eur.nl/gryglewicz/.
|
|
